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The Urge To Merge: Contemporary Theories on
The Rise of Conglomerate Mergers in the 1960s
I. INTRODUCTION
Merger for the sake of merger, I believe is not justified. Merger for the sake of
profit-and profit as a reward for entrepreneurship and risk-taking with its
concomitant benefits to society as a whole-is justified. It is a new way of life.
Indeed, it may well be the only way of business life.'
WHEN HERBERT BRINBERG MADE THESE REMARKS at a 1968 Conference on Merg-
ers and Acquisitions at Hofstra University, the American economy was in the midst
of its third major merger movement of the century.' During this wave of merger
activity-which began quietly in the years following World War II and reached its
peak in the 1960s and 1970s-many entities followed the pattern of amalgamating
a number of unrelated businesses to form large conglomerate corporations.3
Brinberg's remarks reflect the prevalent belief of this period-that establishing
conglomerate corporations can produce a superior business entity in terms of cor-
porate efficiency and risk.
In America during the 1960s and 1970s, conglomerate mergers and conglomer-
ate corporations were the "fashionable" form of corporate acquisition.4 The tradi-
tional conglomerate firm was an "amalgam of the assets and resources of many
independently large enterprises which by themselves frequently represent some of
America's biggest and best known corporate names."' The merger wave was
spearheaded by the establishment of multinational conglomerate entities, such as
International Telephone & Telegraph, Litton Industries, Gulf & Western, Textron,
and Ling Tecmo Vought.6 The push toward conglomeration, however, was driven
. B.A., University of Pennsylvania; J.D., University of Maryland School of Law.
1. Speech of Herbert R. Brinberg, Proceedings of the Conference on Mergers and Acquisitions 80 (Mc-
Cutchan Publishing Corp. 1968).
2. See John T. Miller, Jr., Conglomerates, Conglomerate Mergers and the Federal Antitrust Laws, 44 ST.
JOHN'S L. REv. 613, 615 (1970).
3. See Dero A. Saunders, Royal Little: The Conglomerator, FORBES, July 13, 1987, at 264.
4. Confused Conglomerates, THE ECONOMIST, January 10, 1987, at 68.
5. Mary Gardiner Jones and Edward J. Heiden, Conglomerates: The Need for Rational Policy Making, 44
ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 243, 243 (1970).
6. Joan Harrison, M&A Timeline, MERGERS AND AcQtUSITIONS JOURNAL, September 1, 2000, at 26.
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by individuals who, "with a mixture of management flair, foresight and sheer en-
ergy, had managed to run efficiently and profitably a disparate bunch of compa-
nies."7 In 1968, at the height of the wave, about eighty-four percent of the large
mergers were of the conglomerate type.' Moreover, conglomerate acquisitions ac-
counted for more than $11 billion of the $12.6 billion in assets acquired through
large acquisitions of manufacturing and mining firms during the same year.9
The conglomeration trend that had taken over the world of mergers and acquisi-
tions during the conglomerate movement ebbed in the 1980s as corporate execu-
tives turned their focus to other forms of acquisitions. The 1980s saw widespread
corporate restructuring that has generally been viewed as an "undoing" of the con-
glomerate wave of the 1960s and 1970s."° At this time, many former conglomerates
sold the previous two decades' acquisitions that were unrelated to their core busi-
nesses." The conglomerate form of business could no longer maintain the investor
confidence it held during the wave of merger activity.'
2
Despite the tremendous growth of merger activity during the conglomerate
wave, academics have never reached a consensus as to how and why conglomerate
mergers achieved their popularity. Although the preceding merger waves had ap-
parent causes,' 3 the conglomerate merger wave departed from the "clearly visible
material and technical motivations" of business executives during the earlier move-
ments. 4 Perhaps one of the problems with analyzing the movement toward con-
glomeration is the apparent lack of relationship among the product lines of
conglomerate firms. Still, the study of the conglomerate phenomenon has proved
to be important because the issues arising from conglomeration affected academics
and professionals in a variety of fields. 5
The focus of this Article will be to examine the motivating factors behind the
wave of conglomerate mergers that took place in the 1960s and 1970s. Although
much of the recent writing on conglomeration was written from an examination of
ex post evidence, this Article will focus on the contemporary theories and motiva-
tions that led individuals during the conglomerate movement to believe that con-
7. See Confused Conglomerates, supra note 4, at 68.
8. Miller, Jr., supra note 2, at 615.
9. id.
10. Peter G. Klein, Were the Acquisitive Conglomerates Inefficient?, 32 RAND J. OF ECON. 745 (2001).
11. See Martin Sikora, The M&-A Bonanza of the '80s ... And Its Legacy, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS, March
/ April 1990, at 91.
12. See Confused Conglomerates, supra note 4, at 68.
13. See Nicholas M. Salgo, Conglomerates: Another Wave of Business Development or the Beginning of a New
Business Era?, 44 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 782, 782 (1970) (stating that a student of business history "will soon be
aware of one fact transcending all the succeeding waves of business accumulations and mergers: that their
motivating factors were relatively easy to recognize, easy to understand, and, consequently, clearly accepted as
justified in the period when they occurred or very shortly thereafter").
14. Id.
15. See Edwin M. Zimmerman, Introduction, 44 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 3, 3 (1970) (noting that "the debate
[the conglomerate wave] provokes is lively and quantitatively substantial among not only antitrust lawyers and
economists but also tax policy specialists, accountants, and those concerned with securities regulation").
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glomerates were "the only way of business life" in the future. 6 At the same time,
this Article will highlight aspects of conglomerate mergers that made many individ-
uals wary of the potential for economic and social harm. The Article will examine
the accuracy of these fears and beliefs based on insights from recent studies of the
conglomerate wave.
Part I will discuss the various definitions of a "conglomerate merger." Part II will
examine a feature of the conglomerate entity that helped to provide support for its
superiority-corporate diversification. During the merger wave, many of the lead-
ing executives believed that corporate diversification, through the acquisition of
related and unrelated business, would establish a large corporation with increased
efficiency and reduced potential risk. Part III will discuss many of the external
factors that allowed for the conglomerations to come to the foreground of the
corporate world in the 1960s. The factors to be discussed include the strict enforce-
ment of antitrust laws on other types of corporate acquisitions, the reaction of the
stock market to conglomerate acquisitions, and the use of accounting techniques to
improve the face of the corporation. The rise and fall of the conglomerate merger
movement cannot be attributed to any one of these factors. Instead, it was the
attractiveness of corporate diversification coupled with external factors that made
conglomerate corporations the dominant form of business entity for the greater
part of two decades.
II. WHAT IS A CONGLOMERATE MERGER?
Before entering into the discussion of how and why conglomerate mergers came to
dominate the economic world of the 1960s and 1970s, it is important to explain
briefly how courts and economists have treated the definition of a "conglomerate
merger." Typically there are three types of mergers: horizontal mergers, vertical
mergers, and conglomerate mergers.17 A horizontal merger is a merger "between
two or more business corporations that market the same or interchangeable prod-
ucts in the same geographic area."'" A vertical merger occurs when a company
acquires another company that does business the acquiring company either as a
customer or as a supplier of products or materials.' 9 A conglomerate merger, the
focus of this Article, is often defined generally as a merger where the relationship
between the two parties is neither horizontal nor vertical.2 0
Under the broad umbrella of the term "conglomerate merger," there are product
extension mergers, market extension mergers, and "pure" conglomerate mergers. A
16. See Brinberg, supra note I and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 84-90 and accompanying text (discussing the differences between these types of merg-
ers and their effect on the enforcement of antitrust statutes).
18. Robert H. Swennes, Three Theories of Potential Competition under Section 7 of the Clayton Act: Reaching
the Conglomerate Merger, 49 TUL. L. REV. 139, 141 (1974).
19. Id.
20. Mergers and Acquisitions: Understanding the Antitrust Issues 371 (Robert Schlossberg, ed. 2004).
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product-extension merger is one in which "the products of the acquired company
are complementary to those of the acquiring company and may be produced with
similar facilities, marketed through the same channels and in the same manner,
and advertised by the same media."21 A market-extension merger occurs between
two noncompeting companies selling similar products in different geographical
locations.22
A "pure" conglomerate merger, typical during the conglomerate wave of the
1960s and 1970s, existed where the relationship or motives between the two entities
was less clear. The U.S. Supreme Court has defined a conglomerate merger as "one
in which there are no economic relationships between the acquiring and the ac-
quired firm."23 The Court's definition is similar to the one Congress had in mind
when it amended the Clayton Act in 1950.4 The distinction between these forms of
conglomerate mergers is often blurred.2" As a result, some commentators concede
that conglomeration is a less rigid term than those for the other forms of mergers.26
III. THE ATTRACTION OF CORPORATE DIVERSIFICATION
I would say that it would be worthwhile for people to sit down and study the
operating margins of companies that Teledyne, Litton... have taken over with
their bright young management teams. I would submit that you will find sharp
increases in efficiency. I've seen this in many cases[,] and even though these
businesses may be in disparate fields, the ingredients of more aggressive, sophis-
ticated management with use of new techniques has made a positive contribu-
tion. . . . I submit that many of these conglomerates will be considerably
stronger in a period of recession than the individual units would have been left
on their own.27
One of the driving theories behind the conglomerate merger movement was the
idea that a conglomerate could be more efficient and progressive in its manage-
21. FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 577 (1967).
22. See Schlossberg, supra note 20 at 373.
23. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. at 577 n.2.
24. See H.R. REP. No. 81-1191, at 11 (1949) (noting that a conglomerate merger exists when "there is no
discernible relationship in the nature of the business between the acquiring and acquired firms").
25. See Peter Asch & Matityahu Marcus, Some Economic Aspects of Conglomerate Growth, 44 ST. JOHN'S L.
REv. 81, 81 (1970) (noting that in the Procter & Gamble case, the FTC termed the "acquisition of Clorox a
Iproduct extension' merger rather than a conglomerate [merger], reasoning that some relationship existed be-
tween the companies' activities, albeit non-horizontal and non-vertical").
26. See Salgo, supra note 13, at 782-83 (noting that "when we use this word 'conglomeration,' we practi-
cally admit that we mean mergers for which the reasons are surely not dear, and in most cases, hardly
understandable").
27. Speech of Samuel N. Seidman, Proceedings of the Conference on Mergers and Acquisitions 80 (Mc-
Cutchan Publishing Corp. 1968).
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ment of resources and economic growth.2" Supporters of the conglomerate form
believed that conglomerate corporations could bring increased corporate efficiency
in two ways.29 First, many executives believed that conglomerations were better
equipped to make use of the firm's capital.3" Second, the management of conglom-
erate corporations could more easily and effectively manage a number of unrelated
businesses through the use of the resources and administration of a single, large
corporation." The expected result of this increased efficiency in capital and man-
agement was twofold: reduction in corporate risk32 and synergistic growth.3 As a
result, the notion that it was simpler and more efficient to grow by diversification
prevailed in the conglomerate merger wave.
A. Efficient Use of Capital
During the conglomerate merger wave, many of the "conglomerators" were driven
primarily by the concept of managing capital efficiently. 4 A corporation's move-
ment toward diversification often started when a company-finding that it had
more money than necessary to meet the requirements of its existing business-
invested the surplus into acquiring new businesses. Based on a number of operat-
ing efficiencies, executives believed that the conglomerate firm was the ideal busi-
ness form to put excess capital to use.3" By combining several separate operations
under a collective company, the conglomerate firm could generate a common pool
of assets that could be disbursed as desired throughout the company's many divi-
sions.36 As discussed later, the hope was that this increased efficiency would help
reduce corporate risk. 7
28. For the purpose of this section, the efficiency of a conglomerate will be compared with that of a
company that specializes in a single product line or service.
29. Supporters of the conglomerate movement actually believed that conglomerate corporations could
increase corporate efficiency in a number of ways. See William J. Kolasky, Conglomerate Mergers and Range
Effects, 10 GEO. MASON L. REV. 533, 534 (2002) (noting that the potential increases in corporate efficiencies
include "providing infusions of capital; improving management efficiency either through replacement of medi-
ocre executives or reinforcement of good ones with superior financial control and management information
systems.., meshing of research and distribution; increasing ability to ride out economic fluctuations through
diversification"). For the purpose of this Article, however, these several ideas have been broken down into two
discrete sections: efficiency of capital and efficiency of management.
30. See id.
31. See id.
32. See Harold S. Geneen, Conglomerates: A Businessman's View, 44 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 723, 725 (1970)
(noting that "[dliversification provides a form of security and insurance, as well as a method of adapting to the
quickening tempo of change").
33. See Jerome S. Katzin, The Conglomerate as an Investment Vehicle, 44 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 801, 802 (1970)
(noting that some conglomerate management teams "seek to acquire companies with some operating relation-
ship which common ownership can make more efficient, the so-called 'synergy'").
34. See Confused Conglomerates, supra note 4, at 72 (describing the story of Royal Little's reasons for
building a conglomerate corporation as "putting capital to its best use").
35. See Joel Dean, Causes and Consequences of Growth by Conglomerate Merger: An Introduction, 44 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 15, 22-23 (1970).
36. See id. at 23.
37. See supra pp. 14-16.
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If a typical conglomerate firm is a collection of separate companies under a com-
mon management scheme, then it is logical that the combination of these compa-
nies would allow for the collection of all profits and assets. In a corporation, the
main source of internal funds is corporate savings, which are the gross cash earn-
ings generated by the company's operations." An individual company is restricted
to using the corporate savings it generates itself." When several corporations unite
through a conglomerate merger, the aggregate of their corporate savings should
create a common pool of funds that the conglomerate may use in the future.4" If a
conglomerate did not make the corporate savings of its several divisions available
for companywide capital expenditures, and thus "[tlo restrict each division to the
reinvestment of its own cash .... [the conglomerate] would destroy a major source
of [its] economic superiority."4 ' Therefore, the benefit of a conglomerate corpora-
tion, when compared to a specialized firm, is that this common pool of funds
would be available for use by any division in the conglomerate, as needed.
In addition to creating a common pool of corporate funds, the conglomerate can
increase corporate efficiency by distributing corporate funds across company divi-
sions as profit opportunities arise. 2 Individual companies lack the same ability to
shift corporate funds to maximize investment returns. 3 Unlike a specialized firm, a
conglomeration can allocate funds to those divisions or operations where the funds
will be put to the best use and earn the greatest returns." Likewise, the conglomer-
ate management can make each division compete for the use of these corporate
funds, causing divisional management to demonstrate why an allocation to that
particular division will provide the conglomerate with a sufficient return on that
investment. A conglomeration does not have to look solely among its own existing
divisions for investment opportunities with the surplus of corporate funds. As is
typical in the experience of a conglomerate, each division would also be competing
with the possibility that the conglomerate corporation could use its excess funds to
acquire additional companies. Supporters of the conglomerate movement saw this
38. See Dean, supra note 35, at 23.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. See Zsuzsanna Fluck & Anthony W. Lynch, Why Do Firms Merger and Then Divest? A Theory of Finan-
cial Synergy, 72 J. or Bus. 319, 324 (1999).
43. See Dean, supra note 35, at 23 (noting that "[flunds can be rationed more knowledgeably and effi-
ciently within the corporate fold than across corporate boundaries by the cumbersome, costly, and relatively
ignorant allocation of funds by the impersonal capital markets").
44. See Corwin D. Edwards, The Changing Dimensions of Business Power, 44 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 416, 431
(1970) (noting that ifa conglomerate wishes to expand, "the diversified firm can divert income from other lines
of business, whereas the specialist cannot, and probably can borrow money on the basis of its multiple opera-
tions and its large size more readily than the specialist, who must ask creditors to put their eggs in its one
basket").
JOURNAL OF BUSINESS & TECHNOLOGY LAW
TIMOTHY M. HURLEY
ability to allocate corporate funds more effectively as a potential source of eco-
nomic superiority of the conglomerate firm.4"
B. Efficient Use of Management and Resources
Parallel to the idea that a conglomerate firm could use capital more effectively than
a specialized firm was the idea that a conglomerate firm could make better use of
its management than individual companies.46 Supporters of the conglomerate form
believed that conglomerate management was superior in a number of ways. First,
this increased efficiency includes not only hiring more effective management teams,
but also providing the ability to shift effective management teams to divisions
where they are most needed at a given time. 7 Second, managers within a conglom-
erate firm would be subject to greater accountability than those who ran specialized
firms.4" Third, conglomerate firms could use managerial and operating resources
more effectively than specialized firms because techniques and resources could be
shared throughout the company.49 For these reasons, many believed that a con-
glomerate could improve the operations of a company simply by acquiring it and
adding it to the conglomerate's existing network of managerial techniques and
resources.
Just as the ownership of a conglomerate firm could distribute corporate funds in
a manner that would produce the greatest return on the investment, conglomerate
management could be allocated in a way that would make the greatest use of its
human resources."s One of the traits that conglomerate executives looked for when
acquiring a target company was the presence of incompetent or ineffective manage-
ment.5' Upon acquisition of a new company, the conglomerate was faced with a
choice: maintain the existing management or replace it with a management team
from within. If the existing management would serve to operate that division of the
conglomerate effectively, the conglomerate could maintain the management of the
target company. Alternatively, if the target company was saddled with poor and
inefficient management, the conglomerate could "move successful executives and
employees where they are going to perform their best.""s In addition, conglomerate
45. See John C. Narver, Supply Space and Horizontality in Firms and Mergers, 44 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 316,
322 (1970) (noting that at the height of the conglomerate merger era, "resource flexibility is by far the rule
rather than the exception for most non-failing, non-trivial firm, and certainly is the case" of the five hundred
largest industrial companies).
46. See generally Dean, supra note 35, at 24-27.
47. See Dean, supra note 35, at 24.
48. Id. at 25.
49. Id. at 27.
50. See Arthur Wyatt & Leonard Spacek, Accounting Principles and Conglomerate Growth, 44 ST. JOHN'S L.
REV. 805, 805 (1970) (noting that "[w]hile diversification has many goals, in the conglomerate era a principal
goal was to permit successful management to bring its expertise to bear in a broader business arena").
51. See Dean, supra note 35, at 20 (noting that "fi]ncompetent management makes a company an easier
take-over target because unhappy stockholders are more susceptible").
52. Id. at 25.
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firms were able to shift management teams across divisions anytime the need arose,
not just upon the acquisition of a new company. Although a specialized firm would
have the opportunity both to shift human resources and to raid talent from outside
the corporation to resolve management issues, many believed that conglomerates
had a greater ability to do so because their management was efficient at supervising
the several divisions of the company. 3
During the conglomerate merger wave, there was an idea that a conglomerate
corporation could increase efficiency by establishing greater accountability for the
actions of management. 4 This theory suggests that the management of specialized
firms were in a position to shirk their responsibilities as corporate officers.55 Addi-
tionally, stockholders in an individual firm can typically sell their shares instead of
dealing with poor and inefficient officers. Therefore, the lack of accountability di-
minishes the efficiency of the firm's management. On the other hand, when a con-
glomerate corporation acquires a new company as one of its divisions, its
management "becomes accountable, not to an invisible stockholder electorate or a
benign board, but to a professional 'high command' which is likely to be geared to
greed."56 The managers within each division of a conglomerate are subject to the
watch of a corporate hierarchy.57 As a result, this heightened attention to the ac-
tions of management in a conglomerate firm increases the overall efficiency of the
firm.5"
The last advantage that conglomerate proponents saw in the business form is the
economies of scale that could be achieved through the spread of managerial re-
sources throughout the company.5 9 These economies include many functions at the
corporate staff level: research and development, advertising, financial staff services,
and computer and information technology.' Of course, these aspects of a corpora-
tion are also available for specialized firms. The extent to which a specialist can
afford to spend funds on each of these activities is limited by the size of the firm. A
conglomerate will likely provide a greater opportunity to invest money into re-
53. See Henri Servaes, The Value of Diversification During the Conglomerate Merger Wave, 51 J. FIN. 1201,
1202 (1996) (noting that "[p]roponents of conglomerate diversification implicitly assume that managers of
conglomerates are better at monitoring the divisions than the external capital market"); Dean, supra note 32, at
25 (stating that there is an implicit belief that "management of a large diversified company will be able to find
within its family or raid talent from outside").
54. See Dean, supra note 35, at 25-26.
55. Id. at 26 (stating that in "a public . . .company, directors tend to be too eminent, too busy, too
ignorant and too nice to ride the president hard").
56. Id.
57. See Dean, supra note 35, at 26.
58. See Wyatt & Spacek, supra note 50, at 805 (noting that "Islince the evolving professionalism of man-
agement would permit better management and increased efficiency in operation of the acquired businesses, it
was postulated that higher profits would result").
59. See id.
60. See Dean, supra note 35, at 27.
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search, planning and management." Moreover, the additional benefit of the con-
glomerate form in this area is that the conglomerate can share and distribute
successful techniques and resources among its internal divisions.
C. Corporate Diversification as a Form of Risk Spreading
Conglomerates valued corporate diversification not only as a way to increase the
efficiency of their companies, but also as a way to reduce the risks associated with
operating a business entity. By the height of the merger wave, the notion of a
corporation as "an enterprise that produces a product for a market and makes its
decisions upon the basis of conditions in that market [was] already obsolete for
many large firms."62 By acquiring companies in several unrelated markets, con-
glomerate firms could provide investors with a diversified portfolio, thought to be
more stable and less volatile than that offered by specialized firms.63
Proponents of conglomerates believed that the conglomerate form could reduce
corporate risk by eliminating the company's dependence on a single product line in
a single market.64 A specialized firm is subject to the movement of the market in
which its product is offered and to the actions of its competitors within that mar-
ket.65 If that market is down, the specialized firm will encounter problems.66 If one
of its competitors increases its control over the market, the firm must react accord-
ingly. In a conglomeration, on the other hand, the operations of the company are
spread out into multiple markets. This characteristic provides a conglomerate with
flexibility with respect to how to manage each of its many divisions.
61
Likewise, this diversification lessens the effect of a negative market reaction
among one of its divisions. Ideally, the management of a conglomeration would
understand the varying strengths of its acquisitions. 6 If one division is encounter-
ing little competition for its offered products in a market, the conglomerate can
adjust its prices so that it achieves the highest profits possible. 69 If a conglomeration
suffers a loss in one of its divisions, it can absorb that loss with the gains achieved
61. See Edwards, supra note 44, at 433-34 (noting that a conglomerate is likely able to afford more re-
search, top management, equipment and machinery, sales efforts, legal efforts, and political dealings).
62. Id. at 425.
63. See Servaes, supra note 53, at 1201 (asserting that "[tihrough diversification, managers create internal
capital markets, which are less prone to asymmetric information problems").
64. See Brinberg, supra note 1, at 83.
65. See Edwards, supra note 44, at 430-31.
66. See id.
67. See id. at 425 (stating that "[tihe essential characteristic of diversification is that, instead of being
exposed to one coherent body of forces that express the interaction of a group of firms that supply the product
bought, the diversified firm encounters, in different parts of its business activities, different buying groups,
different characteristics in their demand, and competitors that differ in number, size, and significance").
68. See id. at 429 (noting that "[wihen a [large] firm produces many products, some of these are likely to
contribute large parts of its total sales and profits; others that currently contribute little are likely to be consid-
ered probable large contributors in the future; and still others are likely to have little importance in the present
aggregate").
69. See id. at 431.
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from the more profitable divisions.7" A specialized firm does not have this luxury.
Thus, the suggested stability that conglomerates could offer their investors through
a diversified company made the conglomerate form a more attractive investment
than its specialized company counterpart.7'
D. Synergy
The operating and financial efficiencies that were derived from this corporate di-
versification gave rise to the idea that conglomerate mergers create synergy.7 Syn-
ergism has been described as a "stimulation of sales and earnings for the combined
operation that would have been impossible for the independent entities alone."'"
This synergy was believed to result from the increased efficiencies provided by the
conglomerate form.74 Synergy was explained not only by financial synergy, which
suggests that conglomerate managers were able to allocate funds more efficiently
than external capital markets, but also by managerial synergy, arguing that top
managers could monitor the operations of a conglomerate's many divisions more
effectively than individual boards of directors or capital markets.0 Therefore, a
conglomeration could increase the value and potential of both the acquiring and
acquired companies through the repeated acquisition of additional smaller firms.
IV. EXTERNAL FACTORS ALLOWING FOR THE GROWTH
OF CONGLOMERATE FIRMS
The rise in conglomerate acquisitions during the 1960s received help from certain
external factors that, like corporate diversification, made the conglomerate form
attractive for both investors and conglomerate management. As noted earlier, cur-
rent academics are unable to agree on a single reason that conglomerations domi-
nated merger activity for decades. At the height of the merger wave, businessmen,
academics, and politicians were equally puzzled.76 This Article focuses on three of
70. See id.
71. See Brinberg, supra note 1, at 75 (noting that conglomerations "provide an opportunity to introduce
counter-cyclical businesses and therefore stabilize the fortunes of the corporation, its employees and its
stockholders").
72. See id. at 98 (Seidman stating that "one should note that the rationale for the conglomerate movement
is the injection of an element of synergy"); Burton Malkiel, A Random Walk Down Wall Street 57 (W.W.
Norton & Co. 2003) (1973) (stating that "[b]y the mid-1960s, creative entrepreneurs had discovered that
growth meant synergism").
73. Malkiel, supra note 72, at 57.
74. See Katzin, supra note 33, at 802.
75. See Bernard S. Black, Bidder Overpayment in Takeovers, 41 STAN. L. REV. 597, 610 (1989) (noting that
one of three distinguishable sources of synergy is financial synergy due to more efficient use of capital and
management talent).
76. The Neal Report in 1969 suggested that there seemed to be an endless number of possible motives for
conglomeration:
"The economic forces encouraging conglomerate mergers ... appear to include the desire of owners of
smaller firms to convert their holdings into more readily marketable securities; the desire of management of
large firms for growth for its own sake, apart from or in addition to growth in profits; the opportunity to bring
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the more commonly recognized influences on conglomerate popularity. First, the
strict enforcement of antitrust statutes against other types of mergers allowed con-
glomerate acquisitions to be a primary option for companies looking to expand
through acquisition. Second, the emphasis that investors placed on a corporation's
earnings-per-share ratio benefited the conglomerate form, because conglomerates
could boost this figure simply through acquisition of a target company. Third, con-
glomerates could improve their overall financial picture by applying certain ac-
counting practices to their acquisitions of smaller firms. Although each of these
factors increased the attractiveness of a conglomeration to both investors and busi-
ness executives, none of these features alone can explain the emergence of con-
glomerate mergers as the principal form of acquisition during the 1960s.
A. Vigorous Antitrust Enforcement
The most recognized theory for the rise in conglomerate merger activity during the
1960s and 1970s was that the merger wave was a response to the government's rigid
antitrust action against a number of large mergers. The direct acquisition of an-
other corporation is one of the most effective ways a company can increase its
economic power. The United States has used its antitrust policy, however, to check
corporate growth through many types of mergers. 77 This was the case in the period
surrounding the conglomerate merger wave. In particular, in the 1960s and 1970s
the government engaged in a strict enforcement of antitrust statutes that checked
the majority of large horizontal and vertical mergers.7" Free from the heightened
more efficient management personnel or techniques to smaller or less successful firms; the possibility of reduc-
ing costs or increasing sales by meshing product lines or processes or methods of distribution; the desire to
diversify business activities and reduce risks; the possibility of using one's firm's cash flows or credit in another
firm with limited access to capital; the tax advantages of direct reinvestment through the general capital market;
and the opportunity for speculative gains through mergers that immediately increase the per-share earnings of
the surviving firm."
1968 PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE REPORT ON ANTITRUST, 115 Cong. Rec. 5642 (May 27, 1969). This Article
does not discuss all of the frequently cited external factors affecting the rise of conglomerate mergers. For
instance, some commentators have speculated that conglomerates were favored because there was a tax benefit
in "investing profits rather than distributing them to stockholders, since the investment enhances the capital
value of the stock, whereas the dividend distribution would be taxed as ordinary income to the stockholders."
L. E. Birdzell, The Conglomerates: A Neighbor's View, 44 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 292, 299 (1970). Also, some have
suggested that the rise of conglomerations in the United States is directly attributable to conglomerate heads'
interests in concentrating power and empire building. See id. (noting that "the interest of management in
expanding into new fields is explained in terms of the satisfactions-financial and psychological-associated
with increases in the size of the organization"); Confused Conglomerates, supra note 4, at 69 (equating conglom-
erate CEOs to "junkies [who] need a regular fix of new acquisitions").
77. See Thomas F. Shea, Antitrust Policy and the Conglomerate Firm: 'A Rose is a Rose is a Rose,' 44 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 533, 533 (1970) (noting that "[tihe guiding principle behind antitrust policy in the United
States is that competition is the key to a successful economic system and the antitrust laws are the tools by
which competition is to be kept viable and effective").
78. See Jerome B. Cohen, The Economic Aspects of Conglomerates, 44 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 49, 49 (1970)
(demonstrating the decline in horizontal and vertical merger activity between 1951 and 1968).
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scrutiny of antitrust enforcement, conglomerate mergers were an increasingly safe
option for corporate growth through acquisition.
1. The Enforcement of Section 7 of the Clayton Act
The government's principal method for striking down anticompetitive mergers is
section 7 of the Clayton Act.79 "Section 7 ... does not create a per se prohibition of
mergers.""° Instead, the statute provides that it is unlawful for a company to acquire
the stock or asset of another company where "the effect of such acquisition may be
substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.""' This provi-
sion was intended to apply the antitrust laws to all types of corporate acquisitions-
horizontal mergers, vertical mergers, and conglomerate mergers.8 2 Still, the gov-
ernment's enforcement of section 7 during the period surrounding the conglomer-
ate merger movement tended to strike down horizontal and vertical mergers,
leaving conglomerate mergers as the only remaining form of merger available.8 3
After the amendment of the Celler-Kefauver Act, horizontal mergers were con-
sistently struck down as anticompetitive. s4 Horizontal mergers involve the combi-
nation of two or more business entities that "market the same or interchangeable
products in the same geographic area." 5 For example, a hypothetical horizontal
merger might be the acquisition of Ford Motor Company by General Motors.
These types of mergers raise antitrust concerns "because they eliminate a competi-
tor and may thereby enable the merged firm to restrict output and raise price." 6 In
addition, horizontal mergers may enable the acquiring firm to achieve market
dominance and prevent increased concentration in the market. 7
Vertical mergers were similarly attacked through the enforcement of the antitrust
statutes. These mergers concern a company's acquisition of another company that
79. See 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2005). The relevant sections of this statute were amended in 1950 by the Celler-
Kefauver Act.
80. Joseph P. Bauer, Government Enforcement Policy of Section 7 of the Clayton Act: Carte Blanche for
Conglomerate Mergers?, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 348, 352 (1983). See id. (stating that "section 7... forbids only those
acquisitions that have a reasonable probability of causing a substantial lessening of competition").
81. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2005).
82. Schlossberg, supra note 20, at 374 (noting that the legislative history makes clear that section 7 was
intended to apply to all mergers, regardless of form). See also Jerrold G. Van Cise, Aristotle and Congress, 44 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 538, 541 (1970) (arguing that at the height of the conglomerate merger wave, it was understood
that conglomerate mergers were within the scope of section 7).
83. Kolasky, supra note 29, at 533-35.
84. See generally United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 278 (1966) (finding that the merger of
two of the largest retail grocery companies in a single market area would result in the elimination of many
smaller grocery firms in the market area); United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 607
(1957) (holding that a proposed merger between Du Pont and General Motors was in violation of section 7 of
the Clayton Act because it was reasonable to foresee that the acquisition of the automotive manufacturer's stock
would result in reduced competition in the market).
85. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
86. Kolasky, supra note 29, at 535.
87. Betty Bock, MERGERS AND MARKETS 7: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF DEVELOPMENTS IN 1967-1968
UNDER THE MERGER ACT OF 1950, at 102 (1969).
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is in either a customer or supplier relationship with the acquiring company."8 The
government sought to check vertical mergers because the acquisition of a supplier
or a customer could "raise significant barriers to entry" or "create serious disadvan-
tages for existing nonintegrated, or partly integrated, firms." 9 For instance, sup-
pose that a television manufacturer acquired the only supplier of a rare phosphor
needed to manufacture color television sets. The acquiring firm would surely bene-
fit from having an internal connection with the supplying firm; other television
manufacturing firms in the market would be conversely harmed by having to seek
out business from a competitor to continue to exist in the market. Thus, the gov-
ernment's enforcement of section 7 made the prospect of growth by vertical merger
as equally unpromising as by horizontal merger.
As a result of the heightened enforcement directed against horizontal and verti-
cal mergers, conglomerate mergers became an increasingly attractive option for
many executives. After the court's decision in FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co.,' it
appeared that the government would challenge any acquisition where the products
of the merging companies were somewhat related.9 Ignoring the fact that section 7
was intended to apply to all merger types alike,92 the government did not target
conglomerate mergers in the same way it attacked horizontal and vertical mergers.93
The rising number of conglomerate-type mergers during the 1960s reflected this
reaction. For instance, during the inception of the merger wave, between 1948 and
1951, conglomerate mergers constituted roughly thirty-eight percent of all merger
activity, with horizontal and vertical mergers constituting the majority of acquisi-
tions.9 4 According to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), in 1968 conglomerate
mergers constituted almost eighty-four percent of the number of large mergers and
eighty-nine percent of the assets acquired during those mergers. 9 The number of
conglomerate mergers continued to rise through 1968, at which point they made
up nearly ninety-one percent of all mergers.96 Therefore, many believe that this
drastic increase in conglomerate-type acquisitions was driven by the courts' elimi-
nation of horizontal and vertical mergers, making conglomerate "the only feasible
avenue of merger.
97
88. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
89. Bock, supra note 87, at 104.
90. 358 F.2d 74 (6th Cir. 1966).
91. See Dean, supra note 35, at 16 (noting that "even acquisitions of products related only by common
distribution and by potential entry might be challenged").
92. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
93. See David R. Kamershcen, Conglomerate Mergers: The Myth and the Reality, 44 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 133,
136 (noting that "while ... section 7 of the Clayton Act . ..has been a fairly effective restraint against
horizontal and vertical mergers, there is a 'consensus that it has not been a significant deterrent to conglomer-
ate mergers"').
94. Shea, supra note 77, at 534.
95. Miller, Jr., supra note 2, at 615.
96. See Shea, supra note 77, at 534.
97. Dean, supra note 35, at 16.
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2. Anticompetitive Arguments Against Conglomerates
Although the government's antitrust enforcement during the 1960s largely tended
to overlook conglomerate acquisitions, critics of conglomeration feared that the
increasing number of conglomerate acquisitions could have an equally devastating
effect on competition in a given market.98 Moreover, the Supreme Court main-
tained that conglomerate mergers were "within the reach" of section 7 of the Clay-
ton Act. 9 Three anticompetitive effects are typically associated with the existence
and growth of large conglomerate mergers: (i) the elimination of potential compe-
tition, (ii) the possibility for reciprocal dealings, and (iii) the entrenchment of a
firm in a market.' ° Each of these complaints revolved around the size and diversity
of the acquiring conglomerate firm. These growing concerns eventually led the De-
partment of Justice to look more closely at conglomerate mergers and their relation
to the goals and purposes of the antitrust statutes.'5 '
First, one possible challenge to the conglomerate form is that the combination of
two large companies will result in the loss of potential competition in a market.0 2
The driving force behind this theory is the idea that the "competition in a market is
impaired when a large firm that might have entered the market is eliminated as a
potential entrant by merger."'0 3 If a firm enters a new market by way of internal
expansion, the market is theoretically more competitive because there is an addi-
tional seller. Conversely, if the conglomerate enters a market through acquisition of
an existing company, the market is damaged because it eliminates the possible in-
crease in sellers. This reasoning assumes, of course, that the conglomerate intended
to enter the market whether or not the merger was available.0 4
One oft-cited example of the government's attempt to protect potential competi-
tion comes in the Procter & Gamble case. In Procter & Gamble, a large manufac-
98. See Luther C. McKinney, Section 7 of the Clayton Act as Applied to Conglomerate Mergers, Incipient
Antitrust Doctrine, 44 ST. JOHN'S L. REV., 635, 635-36 (1970) (noting that "[ciritics of large, diversified corpo-
rations fear not only that conglomeration lessens competition in various product lines, but also that it is
responsible for the centralization of industrial resources into fewer and fewer hands").
99. FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 577 (1967).
100. See Richard A. Posner, Conglomerate Mergers and Antitrust Policy: An Introduction, 44 ST. JOHN's L.
REV. 529, 530-31 (1970).
101. See Bauer, supra note 80, at 349 (stating that "[tihe growing concern about conglomerate mergers was
reflected in part in the [Merger] Guidelines promulgated by the Department of Justice in 1968").
102. See United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964) (holding that the merger between the
largest out-of-state supplier of natural gas to California and a competitor in a neighboring market would
substantially lessen the competition in the market); Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. at 578- 79 (holding that the
proposed merger would reduce the potential number of competitors in the bleach market).
103. See Posner, supra note 100, at 531.
104. See United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158, 176-77 (1964) (finding that the court will
look to objective factors indicating that a particular firm is a potential entrant, even if the "subjective evidence
that the company intends to enter does not exist"). Additionally, in determining whether a corporation is a
likely potential entrant, 'the Department will consider the firm's ability to enter the market, in terms of its
technological and financial resources, as well as its economic incentives to enter, in terms of the attractiveness
of the market." See Bock, supra note 88, at 106.
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turer of household products acquired the assets of Clorox Chemical Co. ("Clorox"),
a major manufacturer of household bleach products." 5 The Court struck down the
merger on the grounds that it would have eliminated the competitive structure of
the market and could eliminate "the potential competition of the acquiring firm." °6
In examining the reduction in potential competition, the Court noted that Procter
& Gamble had considered entering the bleach market independently, but con-
cluded that entrance by acquisition would be a more economic means of achieving
market dominance. 7 Critics of conglomeration asserted that the Court should ap-
ply this potential competition charge more frequently to "pure" conglomerate
mergers as well.'
Second, the acquisition of companies, though not directly related, could increase
the likelihood of reciprocal dealings. Reciprocity is defined as "the practice of mu-
tual purchasing and selling between pairs of business enterprises, such that each
reciprocating firm is both a customer and a supplier of its reciprocity partner, and
vice versa."'0 9 In its most basic form, this reciprocity takes the form of"I will buy X
from you if you buy Y from me." In the conglomerate context, the danger with
reciprocity is that a conglomerate's management will use the ability to deal within
the company to make business deals it would not otherwise make."0 As a result, the
remaining companies are weakened by the loss of a potential business partner.
Although reciprocity is not unique to conglomerate corporations, the increase in
the number and size of conglomerations during the 1960s highlighted the potential
threat of reciprocal buying and selling. One of the benefits of conglomerate corpo-
rations is the diversity of products they offer."' Although this diversification may
be seen as a benefit to the economic efficiency of a conglomeration, a company that
can purchase many of the products and services it needs from within its own divi-
sions could damage the potential business partners in their respective markets.
Therefore, diversification may create a greater potential for a conglomerate firm to
engage in this anticompetitive practice." 2
105. Procter 6- Gamble Co., 386 U.S. at 570-72.
106. Id. at 578.
107. Id. at 580-81.
108. See McKinney, supra note 98, at 641 (noting that "the decisions of the Supreme Court clearly demon-
strate that when an oligopolistic market structure exists, and the acquiring firm is the most likely entrant, as
evidenced by ability, product affinity and past history, the potential competition theory can be utilized to block
the acquisition of a significant factor in the market").
109. Lee E. Preston, A Problematic Approach to Conglomerate Mergers, 44 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 341, 347-48
(1970).
110. See FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592, 594 (1965) (noting that the vice of reciprocity is
that it injects "an irrelevant and alien factor" into the choice of the supplier). But see Posner, supra note 101, at
530 (arguing that "[i]f a firm sells in a competitive buying market, it will not purchase on disadvantageous
terms in order to retain the patronage of the seller . assum[ing that businessmen are rational").
111. See supra Part II.
112. But see Wesley J. Liebeler, The Emperor's New Clothes: Why Is Reciprocity Anticompetitive?, 44 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 545, 545 (1970) (asserting that reciprocity is not always anticompetitive and may be "beneficial
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Lastly, critics of conglomerate acquisitions suggested that the acquisition of a
smaller company by a large diversified conglomerate "entrenches" the position of
the smaller company in the market."3 The notion of "entrenchment" stems prima-
rily from the financial status of the acquiring conglomerate."' Critics viewed con-
glomerations as "deep pocket" entities that could use the resources from the entire
firm to secure the place of the smaller firm in its existing market."' "Entrench-
ment" can result in any of number of anticompetitive effects. For instance, some
argued that a conglomerate's "entrenchment" could make "competition by its com-
petitors more difficult, raising barriers to entry, and making it less likely that other
companies will enter the target's market."" 6 Therefore, as a result of the size and
diversity of the company, a conglomeration could impair competition in any of the
markets it enters by providing the smaller acquired firm with access to its arsenal of
marketing, financial, and managerial advantages.
The Procter 6 Gamble case also illustrates the fear of entrenchment. The FTC
had determined that the substitution of Procter & Gamble for Clorox, an already
dominant firm in the bleach industry, would affect the market in a number of the
ways described above." 7 In accepting the FTC's position, the Court looked at the
enormous advantage in advertising and marketing that Procter, and therefore
Clorox, would derive from the merger."' As one of the nation's largest advertisers,
Procter could achieve economies in advertising that smaller, specialized firms in the
bleach industry could not."9 In addition, critics noted that "Procter's financial re-
sources ...could make Clorox virtually impregnable: Smaller bleach producers
would not compete too aggressively for fear of retaliation, and prospective new
bleach producers, faced with the prospects of huge short-term defensive advertising
campaigns by Procter-Clorox, might be far less willing to enter the market."'"2
Critics of conglomerations argued that these anticompetitive effects were com-
monplace among conglomerate acquisitions and urged for stricter enforcement of
antitrust statutes against such mergers. In response, proponents of conglomera-
tions argued that the size and diversification of the companies were positive aspects
and that, in fact, conglomerations could increase the competitiveness of a given
to the competitive process, even though, like most aspects of competition, it may discomfort some
competitors").
113. See Bauer, supra note 80, at 353.
114. See id.
115. Schlossberg, supra note 20, at 377.
116. Bauer, supra note 80, at 353; See also Schlossberg, supra note 20, at 377 (noting that "the deep pocket
alone would discourage competition and entry because the company could obtain financial or other backing to
better withstand narrow profit margins").
117. FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 575 (1967).
118. Id. at 573 (stating that in "the marketing of soaps, detergents, and cleansers, ... advertising and sales
promotion are vital").
119. Id.
120. John Vanderstar, Conglomerate Mergers: The Developing Antitrust Guidelines, 44 ST. JOHN'S L. REv.
596, 604 (1970).
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market. Toward the end of the 1960s, the Department of Justice began to challenge
conglomerate mergers on a number of these grounds. 2' Still, the courts found that
the mere presence of one or more of these three effects was not a per se finding that
a conglomerate acquisition should be undone.'
B. The Emphasis on Earnings-Per-Share Ratios
A second explanation as to why conglomerations took over the merger world of the
1960s was that the acquisition itself could be made to create an increase in earnings
per share.'23 The earnings-per-share figure is "one of [the] key financial ratios that
corporations report to their shareholders," as well as disseminate in the financial
press.'24 Although much has been written in hindsight about the practice of earn-
ings-per-share manipulation, it was understood that this was the way of the con-
glomerate at the height of the merger movement as well.'25 Conglomerate
executives understood that it was an "algebraic fact that when one firm acquires
another with a lower [PE (price/earnings) ratio], its EPS [(earnings per share)]
rises."' 26 As a result of this manipulation, conglomerations have been called "fig-
ments of Wall Street's imagination." '27 Still, investor reliance on the earnings-per-
share figure helped to support the rise in merger activity in the 1960s.
The typical conglomerate transaction occurred when a conglomerate, usually
with a high price/earnings ratio, acquired a company with a much lower price/
earnings ratio. 2 ' For instance, suppose that the stock of a conglomerate firm (Con-
glomerate) is selling at $45 per share and is earning $1 per share. A second firm
(Target), a specialized company with the same number of outstanding shares, has
stock selling for $10 per share and earning $1 per share as well. In an attempt to
acquire Target, Conglomerate offers one of its shares for every three of Target's
shares. 29 After the merger, Conglomerate can combine the earnings of the two
firms and restate them for the diluted equity. Therefore, the result of the acquisi-
121. As of 1968, the Department of Justice had begun to challenge the acquisition of Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corporation by Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc., to compel the divestiture of Canteen Corp. by International Tele-
phone and Telegraph Corp., and to attack the proposed takeover of B.F. Goodrich Co. by Northwest Industries,
Inc. See Shea, supra note 77, at 536.
122. Id.
123. Malkiel, supra note 72, at 57; John G. Matsusaka, Takeover Motives During the Conglomerate Merger
Wave, 24 RAND J. OF EcoN. 357, 359 (1993) (describing that buyers were driven by earnings-per-share
manipulations).
124. Martin Mellman & Norman Prisand, That Complex Earnings Per Share Figure (A Product of the Merger
Movement), 44 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 894, 894 (1970).
125. See Dean, supra note 35, at 17 (stating "[u]nderstandably, rapid and uninterrupted growth in earnings
per share is the central objective of the modern conglomerate").
126. Matsusaka, supra note 123, at 359.
127. Cohen, supra note 78, at 50.
128. See id. at 51 (proposing the hypothetical throughout this paragraph); Matsusaka, supra note 123, at
359.
129. This would be an agreeable offer for Company B's shareholders, because it would result in a 50%
premium on the shares. See Cohen, supra note 78, at 51.
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tion is that Conglomerate's stock now earns $6 for every four shares, for a per-
share profit of $1.50.3 0 Although there has been no change in the performance of
the companies apart from the actual acquisition, the earnings per share of the re-
sulting conglomeration is higher. To continue to be attractive to its shareholders
and its investors, conglomerates were required to continue this pattern of acquisi-
tions. Otherwise, as some predicted, the conglomeration would no longer enjoy the
confidence of its investors. 3'
The emphasis investors placed on the earnings-per-share figure gave conglomer-
ate corporations the incentive to continue to manipulate their earnings per share
through acquisition.'32 Whenever a company acquired another company whose
shares were selling at a lower price/earnings ratio, the result would inevitably be
that the earnings per share of the merged company would be predictably higher
than it was in the previous year. These acquisitions gave the appearance of corpo-
rate growth where there was actually none. "
C. The Use of Questionable Accounting Practices
The rise in conglomerate mergers can also be explained by the benefits conglomer-
ations derived from certain controversial accounting practices. Specifically, the
pooling-of-interests accounting method and the accountant's treatment of goodwill
are two issues that frequently drew criticism toward the height of the conglomerate
merger area. The pooling-of-interests method and the goodwill controversy are not
unique to conglomerate mergers. Each of these practices was generally available for
use by accountants dealing with nonconglomerate companies.'34 In fact, "the ac-
counting profession [had] not developed any new accounting principles or prac-
tices in the 1960's which could be cited as fostering conglomerate growth."'3
Instead, conglomerates drew criticism for these practices mainly because the fre-
quency of acquisitions by conglomerates highlighted the issues raised by the meth-
ods. 3 6 Despite the contentions raised by the movement's critics, these accounting
130. Accordingly, Conglomerate's stock based on its price/earnings ratio of 45 rises to $67.50. See id.
131. See Cohen, supra note 78, at 52 (predicting that "a day of reckoning will come if the conglomerate runs
out of acquisitions, or its price-earnings ratio falls. Then, if there is no internal growth in earnings, the market
price of the conglomerate's stock will fall as growth expectations collapse").
132. See Birdzell, supra note 76, at 293 (noting that "[tihe high price-earnings ratios placed on the leading
conglomerates by an enthusiastic stock market gave them the appearance of a wave of the future, with a
potential without clear limits").
133. Gilbert Burck, The Merger Movement Rides High, FORTUNE, Feb. 1969, at 81.
134. See Wyatt & Spacek, supra note 50, at 827 (stating that the "fact is, of course, that accounting principles
applicable to conglomerates are no different from those applicable to the wide range of nonconglomerate
businesses").
135. Id. at 808.
136. See Homer Kripke, Conglomerates and the Moment of Truth in Accounting, 44 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 791,
795 (1970) (noting that the "pooling and goodwill controversies.., are not peculiar to conglomerates, but they
are highlighted by the frequency of acquisitions by conglomerates").
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principles aided the rise of conglomerates by allowing conglomerate firms to take
advantage of these beneficial practices.
The pooling-of-interests accounting method can be used to increase the financial
appearance of a conglomerate after an acquisition. The method was one of two
available accounting methods during the conglomerate merger movement. The
first was the purchase accounting method, through which the acquiring company
would include the fair market value of all assets of the acquired company, including
intangibles, into its balance sheet.'37 The pooling-of-interests method allows a con-
glomerate corporation simply to combine the balance sheets of the merging and
acquiring companies as they existed before the acquisition. There is no adjustment
in the basis of the acquired firms' assets; all assets and liabilities "in the accounts of
both or all predecessor companies simply are carried forward to the accounts of the
continuing or resulting enterprise."'38 Upon a comparison of these two accounting
methods, conglomerate management concluded that the pooling-of-interests
method was a more desirable practice from the point of view of the acquiring firm.
Although the pooling-of-interests accounting method has its benefits for the fi-
nancial appearance of the conglomerate firm, many critics of the method suggested
that the practice lent itself to questionable applications. Similar to the earnings-
per-share manipulation described in the previous section, the pooling-of-interests
method allowed firms to demonstrate a significant increase in earnings per share
on their balance sheets.'39 Therefore, a conglomerate that failed to achieve its earn-
ings expectations could mask its deficiency by acquiring another firm and adding
the entire yearly earnings of the acquired firm to the conglomerate's existing bal-
ance sheet. 40 The practical result, as critics argued, was that conglomerate corpora-
tions took advantage of these accounting options "to glamorize their profit
performance to exploit speculative behavior in a securities market hungry for
'growth' type companies......
A second accounting practice that allowed conglomerates to demonstrate an im-
proved post-acquisition financial picture was the treatment of goodwill. Goodwill
is commonly referred to as the difference between the price paid by the acquiring
firm in an acquisition and the current values of the acquired firm's tangible assets.
Many executives and accountants disfavored amortization of goodwill "not only
137. See Wyatt & Spacek, supra note 50, at 811.
138. Id. at 811.
139. Id. (noting that when "the book values of tangible assets differ greatly from their fair values . . .a
substantial but spurious profit can be reported"). See also Lee J. Seidler, Mergers: The Accountant as a Creative
Artist, 44 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 828, 841 ("It is logical to expect that pooling with a profitable company will
increase total earnings").
140. See Abraham M. Stanger, Accounting for Business Combinations: Choice or Dilemma, 44 ST. JOHN'S L.
REV. 864, 868 (1970) (stating that the acquiring company "acquires the benefit of the prior earnings of the
acquired corporation by reflecting these on its balance sheet and by restating prior income statements on a
combined basis").
141. Henry P. Hill, Accounting Options for Conglomerate Growth, 44 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 855, 855 (1970).
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because of its impact on earnings, but also because it injects a meaningless element
into the determination of income."'4 This treatment of goodwill is tied into the
discussion of the pooling-of-interests practice. Under the pooling-of-interests
method of accounting, the balance sheets of the acquiring firm fail to recognize
goodwill. As a result, the acquiring conglomerate does not have to deal with the
issue of goodwill amortization.
These two accounting practices primarily allowed conglomerate corporations to
improve their financial images through the continuous acquisition of target com-
panies. Because of their highly diversified business activities and their desire to
grow through acquisition, conglomerate companies likely encountered these ac-
counting questions more often than specialized firms did.'43 As noted earlier, the
conglomerates did not employ unlawful or fabricated accounting practices in their
acquisitions of other companies."' Their ability to rely on the pooling-of-interests
method, and therefore on the nonrecognition of goodwill, helped maintain investor
interest and confidence in the conglomerate form by improving their overall finan-
cial picture with their patterns of acquisition.
V. CONCLUSION
Looking back on the 1960s, many academics discredit the theories that served as
the impetus for the heightened conglomerate merger activity. Current research
proposes that despite their appearance of financial growth and the idea of synergy
between two merging companies, many conglomerations were not financially
sound in their post-takeover life.' Moreover, some research explains that corpo-
rate diversification, though idealized by the proponents of the conglomerate era,
actually reduced the value of the conglomeration.4 6 Perhaps this is one explanation
for why the conglomerate merger wave waned in the early 1980s, when conglomer-
ate executives began to divest the divisions they acquired during the 1960s and
1970s.
14 7
For as long as the wave lasted, however, the conglomerate merger form appeared
to be the most attractive type of business entity available for investors and business
executives alike. In part, conglomerates gained popularity because they appeared to
142. Wyatt & Spacek, supra note 50, at 812; see also Kripke, supra note 136, at 796 (relating that "[iln
purchase accounting the acquisition puts them on the books of the acquiring company as goodwill, where they
again hurt earnings if the goodwill is amortized").
143. See Russell A. Taussig, Combinations, Permutations and Pooling, 44 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 846, 846 (1970)
(noting that "[olne outspoken critic of pooling has expressed the opinion that many acquisitions would be
impossible were it not for the cosmetic accounting used by corporate raiders to improve . . . reported
earnings").
144. See Wyatt & Spacek, supra note 50, at 827.
145. See Fluck & Lynch, supra note 42, at 320 (stating that studies indicate that, "at least for the 1960s, many
of these conglomerate mergers involve financially distressed firms").
146. Id. at 319 (noting that several studies have shown that diversification tended to be value reducing).
147. Id. (noting that studies conducted show that somewhere between 33% and 50% of companies acquired
during the conglomerate merger wave of the 1960s and 1970s were subsequently divested).
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be a more stable and efficient type of company than a firm that specialized in only
a single product and operated in only one market. Additionally, the earning power
of conglomerations appeared to investors to be ever-increasing through the manip-
ulation of the earnings-per-share ratio and certain controversial accounting prac-
tices. Lastly, it is possible that conglomerations came to the foreground of the
business world because executives seeking expansion through acquisition had no
alternative other than the conglomerate merger. Taken alone, each of these expla-
nations for the increase in conglomerate merger activity would not justify such a
tremendous surge in the conglomerate form. The combination of these factors, as
well as others that lie beyond the scope of this Article, 48 create a framework that
could help explain why proponents in the merger-wave era believed that the con-
glomerate form would be "the only way of business life" in the future. 49
148. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
149. See Brinberg, supra note 1 and accompanying text.
VOL. 1 NO. 1 2006
